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1 Introduction
Recent research has drawn an ominous picture of the implications of cultural heterogeneity on
social peace and economic growth. A large literature shows a negative relationship, though not al-
ways robust, between ethnic diversity and the quality of public goods (Alesina et al., 1999; Alesina
and La Ferrara, 2000; Miguel, 2004; Miguel and Gugerty, 2005), welfare spending (Luttmer, 2001),
civil conflict and trust (Fearon and Laitin, 2000; Putnam, 2007; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002)
and economic growth (Alesina et al., 1999). The leading explanations of why ethnic fragmenta-
tion affects those outcomes are the heterogeneity of preferences and the free-rider problem which
undermines collective action. The literature thus views the problem of fractionalization in terms
of voting behavior on aggregate outcomes such as public goods provision at the country or county
level. Yet, little is known on how diversity directly affects social relationships and well-being at
the neighborhood level. Our paper fills this gap by looking at the effect of ethnic diversity on the
quality of common spaces through social relations within local communities at the housing block
level. Moreover, we provide a new identification strategy to overcome the endogeneity problem
raised by residential self-selection. We rely on a natural experiment of exogenous spatial allocation
in the French public housing sector to identify the causal effect of diversity on those outcomes.
The main contribution of our paper is to identify the effect of ethnic diversity on social rela-
tionships and the quality of public goods at a very local block level. We use micro data on housing
conditions where the units of observation are public housing blocks, defined as sets of houses or
apartments buildings delimited by the surrounding streets.1 This is a key improvement for the
analysis of how diversity shapes social relationships compared to the previous literature which is
based on aggregated data at the county, regional or country levels. Diversity might matter for
various reasons at different levels and the channels through which diversity operates are likely to
depend on the size of the unit of observation. By focusing on the provision of public goods at an
aggregate level, the previous literature is mainly interested in the effect of diversity on collective
action through lobbying or patronage (see Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) for a survey). Instead,
we analyze in this paper how diversity within a small community affects individual well-being
and satisfaction with housing conditions through relationships among neighbors. We exploit the
French Housing Survey that reports specific information about the neglect and voluntary degrada-
tions of the public areas, the quality of the housing, and interpersonal conflicts between neighbors.
This data makes it possible for the first time to identify various effects of diversity on local social
relationships and public goods outcomes, and to explore the possible channels explaining this link.
When residents of more diverse blocks report that neglect and voluntary degradations are rife
in their housing unit, we interpret this as a result of the residents’ failure to develop social norms
and other regarding preferences. When they report the breakdown and the poor quality of basic
facilities (such as heating and soundproofing), we interpret this as a result of a diminished capacity
for collective action for social improvement. Those goods are of course not directly degraded by
diversity. But diversity might be associated with lower ability for collective action, explaining the
1Our units of analysis, called ilots in French, are in fact defined similarly to US census blocks.
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irregularity of maintenance and the absence of repairs in more diverse blocks. In this case, the
result could be supported in equilibrium if the landlords reckon that they can neglect facilities in
ethnically heterogeneous housing projects, knowing that they will not face collective action from
their tenants demanding better services. Finally, when residents report incidents of direct inter-
personal conflicts, we can interpret this as an effect of diversity on cultural enmity. We test these
channels by using indirect and objective measures of the quality of social relationships and common
spaces, such as the number of repairs and the upkeep of the security equipment. We also exploit
data on municipal police and show that local police resources are higher in more diverse area. We
find that diversity decreases the quality of local common spaces, but has no effect on public safety.
We also show that individuals are more likely to report the absence of any social relationship with
their neighbors than interpersonal conflicts with them. We thus conclude that diversity leads to
social anomie, preventing the emergence of social norms and collective action.
In order to make unbiased causal inferences, we provide a new strategy for identifying the
causal effect of diversity on economic and social outcomes. The general concern in this literature is
that the endogenous residential sorting of individuals on ethnic grounds biases the estimate of the
impact of diversity. We address this issue by using a natural experiment in which households in
France are allocated to public housing blocks without taking their ethnic origin or their preference
for diversity into account. Due to a strongly republican ideology, the French public housing system
allocates state planned moderate cost rental apartments (HLMs - Habitations à Loyer Modéré) to
natives and immigrants without concern for their cultural and ethnic background, mixing people
indiscriminately. Some HLM neighborhoods are consequently quite diverse, and others quite ho-
mogeneous. Furthermore, HLM inhabitants rarely move, as the rents are much lower than market
rates. Consequently, residents cannot choose whether to live near people like themselves. Rather,
they accept their placement, whether next to co-ethnics or strangers. Methodologically, this means
that we can take the degree of diversity in any one HLM block as exogenous, connect the level of
diversity with the housing situation, and examine whether greater heterogeneity leads to poorer
provision of public goods or more troubled social relationships in French communities. We exten-
sively document the actual process of allocation of households within the public housing sector. We
show that legal rules prohibit housing allocation based on ethnic backgrounds and that in practice,
the characteristics of the public housing sector make it very complicated to bypass the law.
We also conduct a variety of formal statistical tests to verify the absence of self-sorting on
ethnic characteristics. In particular, we run various placebo tests at the housing block level on
housing characteristics that logically cannot be related to diversity, i.e. fixed characteristics over
which residents cannot have any control. We show that diversity does not correlate with measures
of exogenous characteristics of the distribution of public housing characteristics. We perform a
variety of alternative tests. Focusing on households that moved into a public housing unit in the
previous year, we do not find any evidence of self-segregation along ethnic lines. We also examine
potential self-selection prior to the move and show that households that have refused an offer end
up living in public housing blocks that display the same ethnic diversity as those who accepted
their first offer. Thus even if some households were willing to be choosy with respect to the ethnic
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composition of their neighborhoods, they cannot self-segregate in the public housing sector due to
the allocation process and the tight supply constraints of dwellings.
Naturally, this paper is not the first one to try to overcome this identification issue. But other
attempts to establish causality rely mainly on instrumental variables.2 However convincing the
instruments might be, this strategy cannot overcome the concern as to whether the instruments
fulfill the exclusion restriction and do not have a direct effect on public goods. For instance, Miguel
(2004) and Miguel and Gugerty (2005) use the pre-colonial patterns of settlement as instruments,
assuming that these variables have no direct impact on present-day ethnic relations. More recently
Glennerster et al. (2013) have also relied on historical data of fractionalization as an instrument.
But since past settlement patterns are likely to have at least some direct impact on present-day
ethnic relations, the exclusion restriction might still be technically violated. Using a natural ex-
periment with exogenous allocation of ethnic groups is thus an alternative strategy to deal with
these traditional caveats. The paper which is the closest to ours is Dahlberg et al. (2012), which
uses a nation-wide policy intervention program that exogenously placed refugees coming to Swe-
den across Swedish municipalities. However, their paper examines in-group bias in preferences for
redistribution rather than the effect of diversity on local public goods and social relationships.
Our paper is related to the large literature on the effects of ethnic diversity on economic and
social outcomes. In US cities, higher ethnic diversity has been found to be associated with lower so-
cial capital (Putnam, 2007; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000, 2002), lower welfare spending (Luttmer,
2001), and poorer quality of public goods (Alesina et al., 1999). In Western Kenya, the greater the
mixing of tribes, the less people have public spiritedness, and the lower the contributions to public
goods (Miguel, 2004; Miguel and Gugerty, 2005). In cross-national surveys, diversity correlates
with low growth in GDP and low quality of institutions (Easterly and Levine, 1997; Alesina et al.,
2003). Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2011) show that islands of homogeneity amid a broadly diverse
country do not decrease the negative effects of diversity on the quality of government.3 Theoret-
ical contributions, in particular on ethnic conflicts, can be found in Caselli and Coleman (2013)
and Esteban and Ray (2011). These findings are depressing, in a normative sense, for those who
herald gains from diversity (Page, 2007); and depressing, in an empirical sense, as in our globalized
world, local cultural diversity is increasingly common (Dancygier, 2010). However, the robustness
of the relationship and the channels at work remain to be determined. Putnam (2007) is careful to
underline that his data allow him only to claim short run correlation between diversity and trust.
2In their seminal contribution to the literature, Alesina et al. (1999) provide a first attempt to deal with this
endogeneity issue by collecting data at different levels of aggregation (cities, metropolitan areas and counties). Their
assumption is that different levels of aggregation allow for the correction of the potential biases introduced by Tiebout
sorting.
3The magnitude of the relationship between those outcomes and ethnic diversity is substantial. Putnam (2007)
finds that the difference between living in a highly homogeneous city (Bismarck, North Dakota) and heterogeneous Los
Angeles is as great as the difference between an area with a poverty rate of 7 percent and one with a poverty rate of 23
percent. Alesina et al. (1999) show that moving from complete homogeneity to complete heterogeneity is associated
with a reduction in spending on roads by nine percentage points. Luttmer (2001) finds that interpersonal preferences
based on negative exposure and racial group loyalty of recipients are associated with 33 percent of the cross-state
variation in the support for welfare spending. Alesina et al. (2003) show that moving from perfect homogeneity to
maximum heterogeneity would be associated with a reduction in a country’s growth rate by two percentage points
per year.
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Miguel (2004) finds no diversity impacts on local outcomes in Tanzania, a country in which the
ruling authorities have sought to ameliorate ethnic cleavages by promoting a common language.
Posner (2004) shows that changed electoral rules can create broader ethnic identities thereby re-
ducing fragmentation. Dunning and Harrison (2010) show that inter-tribal polarization in Mali
is reduced with cross-cutting cleavages. Glennerster et al. (2013) also argue that the presence of
strong chiefs at the local level, although reinforcing the salience of ethnicity, translates into effective
inter-ethnic cooperation.4 Finally, Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) document the potential positive
effect of diversity on productivity through complementarity in skills.
Our paper is also incidentally related to empirical works examining neighborhood effects on so-
cial and economic outcomes. So far, the literature has mainly focused on the neighborhood effects
on physical and mental health, economic self-sufficiency, risky and criminal behavior, or educational
outcomes (see among many others Katz et al., 2001; Oreopoulos, 2003; Goux and Maurin, 2007;
Kling et al., 2007). In particular, Katz et al. (2001) and subsequent contributions use the Mov-
ing to Opportunity program to estimate the externalities from neighbors. To avoid the problem
of endogenous neighborhood selection, those authors use data from this randomized experiment
in which some families living in high-poverty U.S. housing projects were offered housing vouchers
to move to higher income areas. While our paper is not based on a randomized experiment, we
also avoid the inferential issues of residential endogenous selection by using the exogenous spatial
allocation of households with respect to ethnic characteristics. We enlarge the dimensions analyzed
in this literature by looking at how immediate neighborhood diversity affects well-being and the
quality of the local environment.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3
presents our identifying assumption on the absence of residential self-sorting in public housing: we
document the allocation process in the French public housing market, providing institutional sup-
port for our assumption. We then demonstrate that at the block level, diversity does not correlate
with measures of exogenous characteristics of the distribution of public housing characteristics. Sec-
tion 4 shows our main results. We document the effects of ethnic diversity on residents’ satisfaction
with their housing conditions, local public goods quality and social relationships. We discuss the
various dimensions and channels through which diversity might matter for households’ well-being
at the local level in Section 5. Section 6 provides robustness tests on the validity of self-reported
outcomes. Section 7 concludes.
2 Presentation of the data
2.1 Data sets
We rely on two representative French national surveys to estimate the relationship between ethnic
diversity and the quality of public space within the housing block.5 In each survey, we focus on the
4Varshney (2003) and Jha (2013) also show how local institutions can ameliorate communal violence in India.
5A third survey, the Labor Force Survey, is used to perform some of the tests presented in the on-line appendix,
and hence described in this appendix.
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sub-sample of public housing population in order to identify the causal effect of diversity and control
for self-sorting. Our main data source is the French housing survey of 2002 (Enquête Logement,
INSEE, hereafter HS), which provides detailed information on the intensity and quality of social
relationships with neighbors and on the quality of local public spaces, ranging from vandalism in the
common areas, to housing quality and conflicts in the neighborhood. The HS also reports detailed
information about the ethnic, economic and social backgrounds of surveyed households.6 The 2002
wave of the HS surveys more than 32,000 households, out of which about 16 percent live in the
public housing sector. Our sample thus contains 5,189 observations (households) living in about
2,500 different blocks. The sampling of the HS is such that all the individuals living in a given block
are not systematically surveyed and are randomly drawn instead. Therefore, we cannot compute
any representative measure of block-level characteristics (in particular, diversity) using the HS
data. We overcome this concern by using a second database, the 1999 French Population Census,
which is an exhaustive survey covering the entire population living in France. Each HS sample is
drawn from the most recent Census and the geographical units of the HS are a subsample of those
of the census. There are on average 2,895 blocks with public housing tenants per département in
the census (the median number is 741). The mean (respectively median) number of public housing
tenants in these blocks is 18.4 (respectively 8). The census provides variables such as birth country
or nationality at birth, from which we compute a representative measure of diversity at the housing
block level, which we are then able to match with the corresponding housing block in the HS. The
census also provides some information about buildings characteristics that will be used in Section
3.2 to test our identifying assumption.
2.2 Fractionalization indexes and sample characteristics
We measure ethnic diversity with the standard fractionalization index (hereafter DIV ) used in the
literature (e.g. Alesina et al. (2003) for a detailed description).7 This index reflects the probability
that two randomly drawn individuals from a given population belong to different groups (previous
studies looked at ethno-linguistic or religious groups, while we focus on diversity in terms of national
origins). More formally, the basic fractionalization index is computed as one minus the Herfindahl
index of group shares:8
DIVl =
i=N∑
i=1
sil (1− sil) = 1−
i=N∑
i=1
s2il (1)
where sil is the share of group i (i=1, ..., N) in area l. If the population living in area l is
fully homogeneous, DIVl equals 0 and it converges to 1 as the population heterogeneity increases.
Note that DIVl can increase for two reasons: it will increase with the number of groups, and
it will increase the more equal the size of the groups. As mentioned above, the census provides
information about the country of birth and the nationality at birth of individuals, allowing us to
construct two different measures of diversity. In the remainder of the paper, we focus on diversity
6Some of the key variables for our study are not public. The French Statistical Institute (INSEE) made their
access possible as part of a convention between the INSEE and Sciences Po. We were required to make use of the
"sensitive" data within the confines of the INSEE.
7We have also tried alternative indices such as polarization indicators, yielding similar results.
8These groups can be defined inter alia by ethnicity, language, nationality or country of origin.
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by nationality at birth, computed at the block level. The distribution of diversity faced by tenants
living in public housing blocks is presented in Table A.1 (Appendix A). The average public housing
tenant surveyed in the 1999 Census lives in a block with 28 percent of diversity. After matching
this measure of diversity to the corresponding public housing blocks in the HS, we obtain that the
average public housing tenant lives in a block with 25 percent of diversity. The highest level of
diversity observed in a public housing block is 87.5 percent in the Census and 80.2 percent in the
HS.
Table A.2 (Appendix A) presents the main socio-demographic characteristics of the public
housing sample from the 2002 Housing Survey. Foreigners (or immigrants) are over-represented
in the public housing population compared to the private housing population. Public housing
neighborhoods are also characterized by a poor socio-economic environment, where individuals
have low education levels and earn low incomes: around one third of adults have no diploma at
all, and the share of individuals having achieved graduate studies is 12 percent, less than half
the corresponding share in the private housing sector. The bottom of Table A.2 also reports some
characteristics of the living environment of the surveyed public housing families: slightly more than
half of households live in buildings built between 1949 and 1974, and the average household lives
in a block where there is a 22 percent unemployment rate, more than twice as large as the national
average in 1999, the year in which the block unemployment rate was computed.
3 The exogeneity of diversity in the public housing sector
This section addresses the main identification issue raised by the estimation of the causal impact
of ethnic diversity on social interactions and the quality of public goods. The issue, common to
all the literature on ethnic diversity, is that fractionalization presents a high risk of endogeneity.
Individuals generally tend to self segregate: they prefer forming links with others like themselves,
with whom they share common interests, and in particular people of the same ethnicity or the same
social background.9 If people can choose the area where they live, diversity would be an outcome
of strategic choices, and attempts at measuring the effects of diversity would be confounded. If all
people would rather move into neighborhoods where people are similar to themselves, and richer
people could better afford to move, we would observe a (spurious) relationship of diversity and
wealth. But if wealthy families that live in diverse settings are those that have a taste for diversity,
the true effect of diversity on social outcomes would be an underestimate. Therefore, the level of
diversity of the neighborhoods is probably endogenous and any estimates on the implications of
diversity will be biased.10
To identify the effect of ethnic diversity, one must therefore study individuals who are assigned to
their place of residence without consideration of ethnic characteristics. The purpose of this section is
to bring forth evidence that spatial allocation of households across public housing blocks in France
can be considered as exogenous with respect to ethnic characteristics due to French regulation.
9Self-sorting is most typically based on race or ethnicity.
10Combes et al. (2012) use customer discrimination theory to show that landlords will tend to discriminate against
ethnic minorities when renting their apartment, bringing new evidence as to why any causal claim of ethnic diversity
on public goods in the private housing market would be biased.
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Naturally, the sample of households that apply for public housing dwellings is endogenous with
respect to economic, social or cultural characteristics. But among the pool of selected households,
we show that their spatial allocation across the public housing blocks of a given département is
exogenous with respect to their ethnic characteristics, conditional on their other characteristics.
Note that the mere fact of working at the block level already decreases the extent of endogenous
sorting. First, although households can generally choose the neighborhood in which they move,
they may not be able to select a particular block in this selected neighborhood. Second, while
it is possible to have an idea of the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of a given
neighborhood, it is much more difficult to observe such characteristics in a specific block prior
to moving. Bayer et al. (2008) rely on this key assumption and provide empirical evidence that
individuals’ characteristics are not correlated within blocks. We present a more formal discussion
and a statistical test of the exogeneity of the allocation process with respect to ethnic characteristics
below.
3.1 An ethnically-blind allocation process built into law
We first document the actual process of allocation of households across public housing dwellings.
This gives a legal basis to our identifying assumption of the absence of self-sorting on ethnic charac-
teristics in the public housing sector.11 In France, the only eligibility requirements for admittance
into the public housing sector are to be legally living in France (as a French citizen or migrant
with a valid residence permit) and to be living under a certain threshold of income per equivalent
household member.12 This income ceiling is rather high: in 2009, this threshold was between 36,748
and 50,999 euros per year for a four-person family, depending on the region of residence (the upper
figure being nearly 3,000 euros higher than the average disposable income of four-person households
in 2007). Using the 2002 Housing Survey data, Jacquot (2007) estimates that given their income,
between two thirds and four fifths of households living in continental France could apply for a
public housing unit. As a consequence, the population eligible for public housing is about three
times as large as the available space in vacant dwellings. Due to the boom in housing prices in
the private sector during the mid-90s and the 2000s, the public housing market became even more
attractive, luring new categories of people who could no longer afford to live in the private housing
market. This inflow increased further the applicants-to vacant units ratio. This implies that other
criteria must be taken into account in the selection process. First, household size is considered to
ensure a suitable match with the characteristics of vacant dwellings. More importantly, the degree
of emergency of the application is taken into account. To administer this, five priority criteria
are defined by law at the national level to ensure that vacant housing will first be attributed to
households with obvious social difficulties: those in which there is a mentally or physically disabled
person; those living in precarious or hazardous shelters due to financial constraints; those living in
11The process of allocation across public housing blocks in France was mainly inspired by theories from Le Cor-
busier (1887-1965). Le Corbusier insisted that France must avoid the homogeneous ghettos of the urban landscapes
elsewhere, and should therefore allocate housing blind to ethnicity, not permitting family networks to grow within
housing establishments. These ideas were translated into state regulation (Bernardot, 2008).
12To compute the income per equivalent household member, the French statistical institute weights each household
member as follows: 1 for the first adult, 0.5 for any other person of 14 years old or older, and 0.3 for any other person
younger than 14 years old.
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a temporary accommodation; individuals living in a precarious shelter who recently found a job
after a long unemployment spell; and spouse-abused individuals.13
To get on the queue for a housing unit, households submit a form containing the following
information: name, date of birth, family situation, employment status, resources of the household,
reasons for applying to the public housing sector (currently or soon to be homeless, or reasons related
to a health situation, family situation, job situation, inappropriate current housing, or unpleasant
environment), type of housing looked for, whether the applicant is disabled and whether this is the
first application. It is important to stress the fact that the application form contains very limited
information about the ethnicity of the applicants: they only need to inform about their nationality,
which is limited to three possible categories (French, European Union, or non European Union).
Entering a public housing unit results in the cancellation (radiation) of the application. There-
fore, when public housing tenants want to move to another public housing unit, they have to go
through the same whole procedure as if this were the first demand, and are given a new application
number. The application form is the same for everyone, independently of whether the household is
already a public housing tenant or not, and simply includes a box indicating whether the current
unit is in a public housing or not. Since both public-housing and private-housing applicants go in
the same pool of applicants, the same criteria apply: resources, family structure, and the five prior-
ity criteria (although the criteria of living in a precarious shelter or in a temporary accommodation
are unlikely to apply for applicants already living in the public housing sector).
We now document the selection process of the applicants. The commissions in charge of allocat-
ing households to vacant public housing dwellings are held at the département level (or at the city
level in the case of Paris which is both a city and a département due to its size).14 Their composi-
tion is regulated by law: a commission includes six members of the public housing offices board, a
representative of associations promoting integration and housing for disadvantaged people,15 may-
ors of the municipalities in which vacant housings are to be allocated, and a representative of any
association defending tenants’ rights. An additional département representative may be part of
the commission. For each vacant housing unit, at least three households must be considered by
the commissioners, who finally decide which household will be allocated to the vacant housing unit
considered, according to the eligibility and priority criteria detailed above. Other criteria such as
the number of children in the household are also taken into account in order to allocate suitable
dwellings.16
13Article L441-1 of law relative to construction and housing - Code pour la Construction et l’Habitat
14Continental France is divided into 22 large administrative areas, called régions (regions henceforth), and into
96 smaller administrative areas, called départements. Each département is hence a subdivision of a region, and
several départements can belong to the same region. Each département is administered by an elected General Council
(Conseil Général) and its President, whose main areas of responsibility include the management of a number of social
and welfare programs, primary and secondary schools, buildings and technical staff, local roads, rural buses, and
municipal infrastructure.
15These associations are officially approved by the administrative head of the département, the préfet.
16Public housing allocation in Paris serves as a useful concrete example. We draw on the official audit ofObservatoire
du Logement et de l’Habitat de Paris (Observatoire, 2011). Paris is a special case as it is, due to its size, a département
as well as a city. The application form, the commission, and the allocation process thus take place in Paris, at the
city level. As of January 2010, there were 186,017 public housing dwellings in Paris. Public housing buildings are
scattered across all Parisian areas, with a high concentration (69 percent) in six districts (the 13th, 14th, 15th, 18th,
19th and 20th arrondissements). Within Paris, 48.7 percent of households are under the income ceiling and could be
theoretically eligible. In practice, only households with very modest incomes apply (71 percent have an income lower
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With the allocation process regulated by legal rules at the national level, it seems unlikely that
households can be allocated according to their origin. The main concern of the commissions is to
favor socially endangered households, as shown by the priority criteria. Finally and most impor-
tantly perhaps, any decision based on the origin of an applicant, i.e. discriminating on this basis,
is prohibited in France. Public housing offices are regularly audited: if evidence of discrimination
is detected, they are judged and punished accordingly. This is why the lawyers Rouquette and Lip-
ietz (1991) stress that the rules of allocation of public housing units that prohibit "localism", and
the high administrative barriers that effectively prevent exchanges of lodgings except for changing
spatial needs of families, make the allocation of public housing units largely exogenous with respect
to the ethnic origins of the applicants.
Despite this legal process of allocation, one might still be worried about the possibility of self-
sorting of households that refuse the residential allocation proposed by the commission. In theory,
households can refuse up to three offers. However, self-sorting, especially on ethnic characteristics,
seems unlikely to be a common practice.17 Residential mobility within the public housing sector is
very low, due to the strong shortage of vacant public housing dwellings. This makes it unlikely that
the selected households could be really picky about the diversity of their neighborhood (see the
study by Simon, 2003). Moreover, rents are considerably lower in public housing than in private
housing, increasing the opportunity cost of moving, and assuring low turnover: the mobility rate in
the public housing sector is even lower than for recent owners. Using data from the 2002 Housing
Survey, Debrand and Taffin (2005) give precise measures of the 2002 annual mobility rates: it
amounted to 10.3 percent for new owners, to 15.9 percent for tenants in the private housing sector,
but only to 9.9 percent for tenants in the public housing sector. While 9.9 percent may seem
high, we show that when households move in a public housing block, they almost never achieve
a placement in a less diverse setting (this is reported in the first section of the on-line appendix
devoted to further tests of the identifying assumption). A corollary of subsidized rents and low
mobility is low vacancy rates. Around 2.75 percent of public housing units were vacant (1.75 percent
for vacancies of more than three months) in the early 2000s as reported by the 2002 HS and the
Social Union for Housing (Union Sociale pour l’Habitat) in its 2011 annual report. In comparison,
the vacancy rate for all types of housing units, public and private alike was 7.9 percent during this
period.
than the minimum ceiling for all France, equivalent to 2,345 euros per month for a household with two children).
On the 31st of December 2010, there were 121,937 ongoing applications, to be compared with 12,500 public housing
units allocated over the year 2010. The breakdown of the households that were granted a public housing unit in 2010
is the following. 67.7 percent came from precarious housing, 28.8 percent came from the private rental sector, and
2.3 percent came from the public housing sector. In the latter case, those are people who moved for larger space
following an increase in their household size (only 12 percent of the public housing dwellings have more than three
rooms). The mobility rate (defined as the ratio of new entrants over the total number of public housing dwellings)
is particularly low: it reaches 5.5 percent in 2010. It is formally possible to indicate a precise neighborhood in the
application form, but in practice, very few applicants (6.6 percent) do provide this information. More than half of
the 121,937 applicants (52.9 percent) did not mention any particular area at all, probably due to the fear of being
rejected on this ground. Among those who indicated an area of preference, 91.2 percent mentioned the area where
they were already living.
17In practice, the share of households refusing a public housing offer is not negligible, but we show that such behavior
does not reflect selection based on preferences for or against diversity. See Section 1.3 of the online appendix.
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This has obvious implications for waiting time. The Paris Region Public Housing Office
(DRIHL) provides information on the average waiting time in the départements of this region. In
Paris, the average waiting time is 6 years for a one-room flat, 9 years for a two-room or three-room
flat and 10 years for a flat of more than 4 rooms. In the Hauts de Seine département (south-west
of Paris), the average waiting time is 4 years, taking all types of flats together. The corresponding
figure for the other départements of the Paris region (Seine Saint Denis, Val de Marne, Seine et
Marne, Yvelines, Essonne and Val d’Oise) is 3 years. The Q&A section of this website also indicates
that "if you refuse an offer that is adapted to your situation, you will probably not get another offer
before a long time period." Importantly, for persons engaged in an emergency process in order to
get a public housing unit due to unfavorable living conditions, refusing a proposal excludes them
from the emergency procedure. Corroborating anecdotal evidence beyond the Paris region comes
from information gathered by the Journal du Dimanche (a generalist weekly French newspaper) in
December 2013. It requested from 15 cities for the average waiting time to get a public housing
unit there. The article reveals that "people already living in public housing often wait more than
others," as is explicitly indicated in the response forms from Lyon, Lille and Nantes. For instance,
in Nantes (the only city providing precise figures), public-housing tenants wait on average 34.7
months versus 21.2 months for the first-time applicants.
All of these considerations imply that households seeking public housing have very limited
control over the precise place where they will be located, or of the degree of diversity within the
block to which they will be assigned. This gives some initial support to our assumption that the
distribution of households across public housing blocks is blind to households’ ethnic characteristics
and to their preferences for diversity.
3.2 Test of the exogeneity of diversity in public housing blocks
We now provide a more formal statistical test for our identifying assumption: we test whether, at
the level of the block, diversity correlates with measures of the distribution of exogenous public
housing buildings characteristics. We focus on building characteristics that are fixed in the sense
that residents have no control over them. This strategy is very intuitive: if the assignments are
random, then knowing the fixed characteristics of the block should reveal nothing about block-level
diversity. More specifically, we run the following regression:
DIVl = α+ β1Zl + FEmunic+ εl (2)
where Zl are the exogenous characteristics of public housing in each block l. The correlation
between these characteristics and block-level diversity (DIVl) is measured conditionally on munic-
ipality fixed effects (FEmunic), which are the smallest geographic level after housing blocks that
we can control for (France is divided into more than 36,000 municipalities). We use the 1999 Cen-
sus data to measure the following buildings’ characteristics, representative at the block-level: the
share of buildings with an elevator, the share of buildings with a sewage system and the median
number of apartments per building. One may a priori think that the median date of construction
of the buildings, or any block characteristic related to a building’s age, could be considered as fixed
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characteristics. The age of the building is actually highly correlated with the waves of immigration
and therefore with diversity, as we discuss at the end of this section. For this reason, note upfront
that we do not perform the proposed test on variables related to a building’s construction date, but
that we use building age as a control variable in the main regressions of the paper. The regressions
are run on the 2,492 blocks for which we observe public housing buildings in the Housing Survey.
The results of this test are presented in Table 1. Columns 1 to 3 show the coefficients associated
with each characteristic in separate regressions. All the characteristics are then included at once
in column 4. The F-test for the null hypothesis β1 = 0 cannot be rejected at the 1 percent level
for all coefficients of the three fixed characteristics that are expected to be totally unrelated to
DIV . This simple test is in line with the idea that the public housing offices allocate dwellings to
households without taking their origins into account, hence supporting our assumption of exogeneity
of diversity in the public housing sector.
As mentioned above, any block characteristics related to buildings age could have been consid-
ered as a fixed characteristic over which residents do not have control, if it was not highly correlated
with the various waves of immigration. The oldest and first public housing units were built before
World War II to welcome both native French workers and immigrants from Southern Europe (Italy
and Spain in particular). The vast majority of public housing structures were built post World
War II to welcome native French leaving the agricultural sector as they moved to industrial ag-
glomerations. Shortly thereafter, these new structures housed the very large inflows of immigration
from the Maghreb that took place between 1950 (post-war reconstruction period) and 1974 to help
boost this industrial development. After 1974, the French government decided to reduce immigra-
tion drastically, limiting it to family reunification. Since mobility rates are almost nil in public
housing, the ethnic composition is largely shaped by those various immigration waves. From the
HS survey, we do observe a peak in the level of diversity in public housing buildings built between
1949 and 1974.18 Therefore, when we regress block diversity on block characteristics related to
the age of the buildings (median date of construction or share of buildings constructed after 1974),
we unsurprisingly obtain a significantly negative coefficient. Yet, as explained, this does not come
as a contradiction to our assumption. In addition, when we replicate the regression of column 4,
controlling for the median date of construction, the p-value for the F-test of joint significance of the
three fixed characteristics considered above is larger than 0.7, as reported in column 5. This sug-
gests that diversity in the public housing sector is exogenous conditional on the age of the building,
which is therefore a key variable to be included in our analysis.
Our identifying assumption is supported by a variety of alternative tests presented in Section
1 of the on-line appendix, and that we briefly summarize here. First, we run additional placebo
tests but at the individual level. We estimate the effect of DIVl on individual outcome variables
that logically cannot be related to diversity, such as the perception of the quality of public goods
that are financed and managed at a more aggregate level (e.g. by the municipality) rather than
locally by the public housing offices. Likewise, we find that the DIVl coefficient is not statistically
18The average level of diversity is 22 percent for buildings constructed before 1948, 28 percent for buildings con-
structed between 1949 and 1974, and then continuously declining from .20 for buildings built between 1975 and 1981
to .15 for those built after 1999.
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significantly different from zero for those outcomes (section 1.1). Second, we test the exogeneity of
the different steps in the allocation process during the application and the refusal decision process.
We show the absence of any self-sorting along ethnic lines focusing on movers into public housing
blocks (section 1.2). Since self-selection could still occur prior to the move, we also focus on
households that have refused a public housing dwelling offer. We show that households having
declined an offer end up living in public housing blocks that display the same level of diversity
as those who directly accepted their first offer. Thus even if households try to be choosy with
respect to the ethnic composition of their neighborhoods, they eventually do not self-segregate in
the public housing sector due to the allocation process and the tight supply constraints of dwellings
(section 1.3). Finally, we compare the observed distribution of diversity across blocks within each
département with a randomly simulated distribution of households, and find that the equality
between the two distributions cannot be rejected in most départements, supporting further our
identification assumption (section 1.4). To sum up, all those tests point in the direction of diversity
being exogenous in the public housing sector.
4 Analysis
4.1 Specification
This section estimates the impact of diversity on social relationships and public goods at the local
housing block level. We identify the causal impact of diversity by focusing on the public housing
sector where households are exogenously allocated with respect to ethnic characteristics. Let j, k
and l indicate respectively households, buildings and blocks. For each outcome, we estimate the
following equation:
Yk = α+DIVlβ +Xjγ + Zkδ +Wlµ+ FEmunic+ εjkl (3)
where Yk denotes the housing outcome we are interested in, as stated by household j living in
building k and block l. Most of the outcomes we consider pertain to the building, but some of them
refer to the neighborhood (in which case we consider a Yl). DIVl is the level of ethnic diversity in
the block, Xj is a vector of household characteristics, Zk a vector of building characteristics and
Wl a vector of socio-economic characteristics of the block.19
The vector of controls includes first the household characteristics that are related to the selection
criteria into the public housing sector (Xj), in particular household size and (log) household income
per member.20 Second, we control for block level characteristics Zk that could be confounding
factors and be spuriously correlated with DIVl. This includes the date of construction of the
building (in six categories), since it might be a strong predictor of housing quality and explain part
of the degradations observed. But this variable is also spuriously correlated with diversity since
19Section 4 of the online Appendix tests the robustness of our results to alternative specifications. First, we control
for ethnic group shares in addition to fractionalization. Second, we try using an alternative measure of diversity
based on a proxy for French speaking. Our main results remain unchanged in both cases.
20We have tested alternative specifications including age, gender, education, employment status and nationality
of the household head since those characteristics could also influence the opinion on housing conditions. Yet these
variables have a very limited explanatory power and do not change our main results.
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it captures the different immigration cohorts, as suggested by the results presented in section 3.2.
Third, we add two variables to control for the social and economic background of the neigborhood
(Wl). One is a detailed classification in 27 categories of the socio-economic environment of each
neighborhood, constructed by Tabard (2002) from the INSEE. This classification characterizes each
neighborhood according to the socio-economic category and the occupation of all male inhabitants.
We use the classification that was built using the 1999 census data. This is the most detailed variable
available in French national surveys to capture the socio-economic background of a neighborhood.
Indeed, an important issue is whether the degree of fractionalization is picking up various dimensions
of the environment where people are living, including the extent of inequality and the unemployment
rate or the socio-economic background of the neighborhood (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002). The
other is block unemployment rate (computed using the 1999 Census) since this is a potential
confounding factor for explaining criminality and other socio-economic outcomes, as shown by
Hémet (2013) and Fougère et al. (2009). Finally, all the regressions include municipality fixed
effects, which is the smallest geographic level after housing blocks that we can control for in French
national databases. They correspond to arrondissements in large cities (Paris, Lyon and Marseille),
and are otherwise small cities. All results derive from OLS estimates, with robust standard errors
clustered at the housing block level.21
4.2 The various effects of diversity
The HS covers a large variety of questions documenting housing conditions, from social relationships
with neighbors to the quality of the housing environment. Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics
of our main outcomes of interest. To organize the discussion, we distinguish three main dimensions:
(a) the neglect or voluntary degradations that are directly under the control of the tenants, i.e. for
which they can be held responsible, (b) the poor quality of basic housing facilities that are under
the control of the public housing offices (the landlords), due to a lack of maintenance and repairs
and (c) public safety outcomes such as personal aggression and robberies, reflecting interpersonal
or inter-ethnic conflict. We have also run an exploratory factor analysis that yields similar, if not
identical, categories. The results obtained with the three indices resulting from factor analysis are
reported in section 1 of the online Appendix.
The first dimension of housing quality refers to actions or goods that are largely under the
control of the tenants. In this category, we include all the variables reporting neglect or voluntary
deterioration in the common areas of the building. First, households are asked a general question
on degradations: "Were the common areas of your building (lobby, staircase, floors) vandalized or
neglected (destruction, deterioration) over the last twelve months?". The answers are 1 for "Never",
2 for "Minor degradations" and 3 for "Major or very frequent degradations". Households are then
asked to mention which kind of degradations they observed over the previous year. They can choose
several possible answers from the following list: graffiti or degradations of the walls (or on the floor),
trash and litter on the floor, broken windows, broken doors, broken light bulbs, degradation of mail
boxes, degradation of the entry phone or entry code, deterioration of the elevator. For each outcome,
21Logistic regressions on dummy outcomes yield similar results. To ease the interpretation of the coefficients, we
will report the OLS estimates henceforth.
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the variable is coded as 1 in case of a degradation, and 0 otherwise. All those items refer more
or less directly to willful degradation. We will thus refer to this set of questions as the category
Vandalism. We also include in this category a question about noise pollution:22 "How frequently
are you disturbed by the noise in your housing during the day?", "During the night?". The answers
are 1 for "Infrequently or never", 2 for "Rather frequently", and 3 for "Very frequently".
The second main dimension of housing quality refers to goods that are not directly produced
or altered by residents. But they might be related to diversity by the lack of maintenance and
repairs by the public housing office to improve the housing quality. We will henceforth label this
category Poor Housing Quality. We include in it variables corresponding to housing problems
that can neither be caused nor solved by the tenants, but for which public housing offices are
responsible. The households are first asked: "How would you qualify the way the common areas
of your building are maintained and taken care of (cleaning, maintenance of collective facilities:
lighting, trash cans,...)?". The answer ranges from 1 for good, to 2 for average, and 3 for bad.
More specific questions are also asked: "How does the façade of your building look?",23 "What is the
quality of the soundproofing of your housing?",24 "Was the elevator out of order during more than
24 hours over the past three months?",25 "Did you experience toilet issues (leaks, flush breakdown,
drainage problems) over the last three months?", or "Did you experience coldness in your apartment
during more than 24 hours over the past twelve months?". We also include more detailed questions
concerning the origin of coldness: "Did you experience coldness because of bad insulation?", "Did you
experience coldness because the heating equipment broke down ?" and "Did you experience coldness
because of poor heating equipment?". For all the previous questions, the variable is 1 when the
answer is "Yes" and 0 otherwise.
The last dimension of housing quality refers to interpersonal aggression and criminality. We
will label this category Public Safety. Three questions correspond to this category: "Have you, or a
member of your household, been a victim of or a witness to physical aggression in your neighborhood
during the last twelve months?", "Have you, or a member of your household, been a victim of or
a witness to a robbery in your neighborhood during the last twelve months?", and "Have you been
victim of a burglary (or any attempt) over the past twelve months?". For these three questions, the
variable equals 1 in case of the event, and zero otherwise.
Finally, we look at the impact of diversity on the overall satisfaction about housing conditions,
using the question: "In general how do you judge the quality of your housing conditions?". The
variable takes on values from 1, for very good, to 5 for very bad. This question on well-being related
to housing conditions is rather general, and summarizes in a way the various dimensions in which
housing conditions could be affected by ethnic fractionalization.
22The underlying assumption is that the source of the noise in the hallways and apartments of the building is not
due to poor soundproofing. As a matter of fact, we see in the following sections that more diversity increases the
disturbance related to noise, but fails to explain the quality of soundproofing.
23There are five possible answers: 1=As new, 2=Good, 3=Average, 4=Dirty, 5= Bad, with cracks, 6=Very bad,
the building is threatened with collapse.
24The possible answers are: 1=Good, 2=Average, 3=Bad.
25In contrast, the question mentioned in the Vandalism section refers to the interior status of the elevator rather
than its mechanical breakdown.
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4.3 Results
Table 3 shows the effect of ethnic fractionalization on the various outcomes related to the three
different dimensions: Vandalism, Poor Housing Quality and Public Safety, and on the respondent’s
general level of satisfaction with housing conditions. For each outcome, we run a separate regression
of the form of equation 3, controlling for household selection characteristics, age of the building
and the socio-economic background of the neighborhood and including municipality fixed effects.
The estimated coefficients for controls are presented in Table B.1, Appendix B.
The first part of Table 3 (Panel A) reports the effect of ethnic diversity on outcomes related to
voluntary degradations and vandalism. For almost all the outcomes considered, the estimated effect
of ethnic diversity is statistically significant at the 1 percent level,26 and is sizeable. Take for instance
the results for graffiti: a one standard deviation increase in ethnic diversity is associated with a rise
by 9.2 percentage points in the probability of observing graffiti, which represents 21 percent of the
total standard deviation of this outcome. The effect of ethnic diversity is twice as large as the effect
of local unemployment: a one standard deviation increase in block unemployment rate is associated
with a rise by 5 percentage points in the probability of observing graffiti, which corresponds to 11.5
percent of a standard deviation of this outcome. Regarding deterioration, a one standard deviation
increase in ethnic diversity induces a 4.2 percentage points increase in the probability of observing
degradation of the elevator, which represents 14.9 percent of the total standard deviation of this
outcome. This effect is three times as large as that of the local unemployment rate.
The second set of regressions (Panel B) shows the effect of diversity on outcomes signaling poor
quality of housing. The coefficient associated with ethnic diversity is positive and significant at the
1 percent level for problems related to elevator maintenance. It is also significant at the 5 percent
level for the maintenance of the common areas and for coldness in the apartment. Diversity, has,
however, no significant impact on soundproofing quality and toilet malfunction. The estimated
effects of diversity, while significant, are somewhat lower than those found for outcomes associated
with vandalism. Consider the probability for the elevator to be out of order. A one standard
deviation increase in diversity is associated with a 4.7 percentage point increase in the probability
that the elevator was out of order during at least 24 hours over the last three months, which is 13.1
percent of the standard deviation of this outcome. If we now turn to heating issues, our estimates
imply that a one standard deviation increase in ethnic diversity is associated with a rise by 4
percentage points in the probability of experiencing insufficient heat in the apartment during more
than 24 hours over the past year, which is 10.7 percent of the outcome’s standard deviation. The
bottom of Table 3 (Panel C) reports the results for outcomes related to public safety, capturing
direct aggression, robberies and burglaries. Remarkably, it shows that ethnic diversity does not
have a significant impact on any of these outcome variables. We offer an interpretation of this
result in the next section.
We finally look at the general level of satisfaction with housing conditions. Panel D shows that
ethnic diversity has a negative effect on satisfaction with housing condition, statistically significant
at the 10 percent level. A one standard deviation increase in ethnic diversity generates an increase in
26The exception is for the indicator for broken doors and noise during the day, for which the effect of diversity is
only significant at the 5 percent level.
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the dissatisfaction with housing conditions that amounts to 6.1 percent of its standard deviation. To
get a better sense of the magnitude of this effect, we can say that the increase in the dissatisfaction
with housing conditions generated by a one standard deviation increase in block unemployment
rate corresponds to 15.5 percent of its standard deviation.
In sum, and taking advantage of data at a more micro level than has heretofore been available,
we see that fractionalization operates with different degrees of impact for different sorts of public
goods.27 Fractionalization at the local level increases vandalism by a great deal, decreases building
maintenance by a moderate (but overall significant) degree, and has no effect on security. The
general negative impact of diversity on the various outcomes is thus consistent with the negative
effect found on the general satisfaction with housing conditions. These findings allow us to propose
in the next section the various channels through which fractionalization affects the provision of
public goods.
5 The channels of impact of ethnic diversity at the local level
5.1 Rationalization of the channels
To rationalize our findings, we propose different interpretations of the channels through which frac-
tionalization could affects local public goods related to living conditions and housing quality. The
category "Vandalism" refers to the neglect or voluntary degradations of the common areas of the
building, such as damaging common property, graffiti, or depositing trash on the floor. These are
outcomes over which public housing residents have control and for which they can be held respon-
sible.28 The category "Quality of housing" includes variables such as quality of soundproofing or
coldness in the apartment. Those variables are more of the responsibility of the public housing
managers. Finally, the "Public Safety" category represents outcomes that are less under the control
of local public housing managers than of the police.
Our interpretation for the results on "Vandalism" is that diversity prevents the creation of social
norms to punish defectors, as the threat of social sanctions is lower across groups. Other-regarding
preferences are less effective in more diverse areas. This has been a standard result in the literature
since the seminal work of Coleman (1988), and it helps explain why we observe more voluntary
degradations with diversity. Supporting our intuition, many households living in the public hous-
ing sector do not generally report having "bad" or "very bad relationships" with their neighbors.
Rather they are more likely to report "no relationship at all" with their neighbors, which prevents
the creation of other-regarding social norms. The increase in graffiti in more diverse areas might
also illustrate the need to mark one’s territory in a context where several groups co-exist. In any
case, cross-group sanctioning to prevent vandalism has been ineffective compared to what we see
in more homogeneous blocks.
27Our findings are unchanged with regressions on aggregated indices obtained with a principal component analysis
and with a mean effect analysis, as shown in sections 1 and 2 of the online Appendix.
28Given that residents need to enter a code in order to gain entry into their building, it is unlikely these degradations
are coming from outsiders.
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We understand the result on "Quality of housing" as the inability of more heterogeneous com-
munities to undertake collective action that would pressure the public housing office into improving
housing quality. This could be sustained (though we have no direct evidence to support this) by
beliefs in the housing directorate that it need not maintain public goods to high standards in het-
erogeneous housing projects because the likelihood of collective action against it is minimal. In
this sense, the resulting poor housing quality associated with ethnic diversity can be seen as an
equilibrium in which the lack of expectations of collective action would fail to give incentives to
the housing directorate to make costly improvements.29 The results concerning heating provides
support for this assumption: we find that households living in more diverse neighborhoods not only
report more heating failures, but also that this is due to the poor quality of the heating equipment,
an appliance typically under the control of the public housing office.
Finally, we can think of three possible interpretations of the absence of any diversity effect
on aggressions and robberies. First, the data presented in the following subsection suggests that
managers in more diverse environments invest more in security equipment than in building quality.
Second, the absence of any impact of diversity on public safety outcomes could result from more
physical security provided by a higher level of administration not subject to the constraints of local
diversity, such as national or municipal police forces. To test this interpretation, we use data on
municipal police, i.e police forces that are managed by the mayor at the municipality level, hence
being more closely related to local concerns.30 Although the municipal police is only one part of the
police force working in a given municipality (the rest of it being the national police), its main role
is to maintain peace, security, safety, health and tranquility in the municipality (article L2212-5 of
the general code of local territories), and is therefore more relevant for our analysis than national
police. The Ministry of Interior has made available (on the government open-data webpage) the
2012 number of municipal police officers in the 4,202 municipalities providing this service. From
this source, we can check how local police forces relate to the level of diversity at the municipality
level. Table 4 presents correlations between the (log) number of municipal policemen per 1,000
inhabitants in a given municipality, and the level of diversity in this municipality, measured in
2011. The first column shows that the raw correlation between the two is significantly positive: the
more diverse a municipality is, the larger the number of policemen per inhabitant. The coefficient
is still strongly positive in columns 2 and 3 where we progressively control for city size and départe-
ment fixed effects. This evidence supports our second interpretation of a higher presence of police
preventing criminal activities. A third explanation, one that encompasses findings for all three
broad types of outcomes, would be that individuals living in the public housing sector experience
social anomie. In fact, one third (32.7 percent) of the public housing population, irrespective of
diversity, declares to have no relationship at all with individuals living in their same neighborhood.
In addition, we find that individuals living in a more diverse neighborhood tend to have slightly
29The collective action could also influence mayor’s office. But the political logic of public housing support is
beyond the scope of the paper.
30By contrast, the national police depend on the préfecture, at the département level. Information on national
police at a very local level is not available.
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fewer relationships with their neighbors.31
Given the nature of social relations in public housing, the most plausible interpretation is that
diversity generates social anomie, i.e. the absence of common rules and social norms. As a conse-
quence of anomie, there are (a) weaker other-regarding preferences and a lack of credible threats
of social sanctions, hence more neglect and vandalism, (b) a failure to generate collective action to
pressure the public housing offices into improving housing quality, and (c) fewer opportunities for
violent confrontation where diversity might have increased incentives.
5.2 Interpretation of the channels based on repairs
We bring additional evidence about the channels based on the repairs performed in the building.
The heterogeneous effect of diversity on repairs depending on the type of public good allows us to
tease out the different channels through which diversity operates. Besides, maintenance and repair
provide an objective interpretation to the previous subjective questions.
The Housing Survey asks whether elevators, staircase, windows, heating equipment, security
equipment, and so on, have been repaired or installed during the previous year. We build three
measures of repairs, corresponding to our three general outcomes. We define a first variable tracking
repairs that usually come in response to degradation imputable to the tenants. Those repairs con-
cern staircase, windows, doors and lights of the commons, i.e repairs related to neglect or voluntary
degradations. A second variable indicates repairs that can be fixed only by the external interven-
tion of the public housing office. Those repairs include revamping of the façade, or interventions
to improve, among other things, the heating system or insulation quality, i.e. repairs related to
the general quality of housing. Finally, we build a third variable accounting for the installation
of security equipment in the building, which can be related to public safety outcomes. We then
regress each of these three variables (as well as less aggregated indicators of repairs) on the level of
diversity at the block level.
The OLS estimates are reported in the upper part (a) of Table 5. Column 1 shows a positive and
statistically significant correlation between the probability of repairs inside the building (windows,
doors and lights in the common areas) and local diversity. In the baseline regressions, (section 4.3
(Panel A, Table 3), we already found that voluntary degradations increased with diversity. This
implies that the larger number of repairs results from a greater need to fix things destroyed by
the lack of publicly spirited social norms, rather than from greater responsiveness by the housing
authorities to regular maintenance.
Column 2 shows a negative and statistically significant correlation between the number of sub-
stantial works in the building (façade, heating, and insulation) and local diversity: the higher the
diversity is, the less the work performed by the HLM offices for improving the general quality of
housing. In the baseline regressions (Panel B, Table 3), we found that more diversity implies a
lower quality of housing. This result thus suggests that more diverse neighborhoods are deprived of
31Our findings are consistent with Fearon and Laitin (1996) who argue that despite inter-ethnic relations being
generally tenser, in-group policing mechanisms emerge endogenously that keep violence off of the equilibrium path.
However, in this case social anomie appears to be a more plausible mechanism sustaining peace as in-group policing
is not likely to emerge where within-group collective action is not observed.
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such substantial work, although the inhabitants actually complain (individually to survey enumer-
ators) about the quality of housing. This supports our interpretation that tenants in more diverse
neighborhoods are unable to engage in collective action to pressure the public housing offices into
undertaking important works.
Finally Column 3 shows a positive and statistically significant relationship between the existence
of security equipment and local diversity. In the main regressions (Panel C, Table 3) we found no
impact of diversity on aggression and robberies. The presence of security equipment in more
diverse neighborhoods can partly explain the absence of diversity effect on burglaries, as mentioned
in the previous subsection. Public housing managers may invest more of their budget in security
equipment than in basic maintenance if they fear security threats.
6 Robustness checks
The analysis has been based so far on self-reported subjective outcomes. A potential concern is
that subjective perceptions could reflect personal bias rather than objective measures of public good
provision. People might just be happier when they are surrounded by people more like themselves,
and this is reflected in their answers to the quality of housing. We conduct several tests challenging
this alternative explanation of personal bias.
First, we can exploit the various types of repairs and work done in the building or in the housing
unit over the previous year. These variables have the advantage of being objective. The lower
part (b) of Table 5 reports simple correlations between the various outcomes and the associated
repairs. Note that because this test aims at testing for the relevance and objectivity of our outcome
variables, it is performed on the full HS sample. We find that almost all the subjective outcomes are
strongly and positively correlated with the existence of repairs, i.e. objective outcomes, especially
for the variables related to vandalism.32 This is our first evidence of the reliability of our subjective
measures of housing quality and well-being.
We then conduct more formal tests, reported in Appendix C. In the following we focus on
the question about dissatisfaction with housing conditions, which is the most subjective of all the
outcomes considered, but the other outcomes yield similar results. We start by regressing this
variable on diversity with our baseline specification, and we add the respondent’s nationality and
interaction terms between diversity and nationality. We can test whether different groups react
in different ways to the level of diversity of their neighborhood. Column 1 of Table C.1 shows
that there is no different effect for the various groups, and the coefficient for diversity remains
unchanged. Then we concentrate on differences between native French households’33 and fully
Maghrebian households’ dissatisfaction with housing conditions. In particular, we interact the
dummies of being in a fully native French household or being in a fully Maghrebian household with
DIVl: none of the coefficients is significant, as reported in column 2. Thus for any given level of
diversity, there is no significant difference in the answers given by fully French and fully Maghrebian
32An exception is the condition of the outside walls, which is negatively correlated with the probability that façade
work was done. This is not surprising as the assessment of the façade’s condition is provided at the time of the survey,
while repairs concern the previous year.
33Both children and parents were born French in France.
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households. In other words, the idea that bad opinions of housing conditions are driven by average
bad feelings due to being surrounded by foreigners can be rejected.
We also look at within-housing project variation in perceptions by regressing self-reported per-
ception on block fixed effects. Assuming there is no within-block variation in public goods, the
remainder of the variation tells us if certain ethnic or socio-demographic groups are more likely
to be positively or negatively biased. If perceptions have a high signal-to-noise ratio, there should
be less within-block variation because perceptions would be a good signal of project level public
goods. Table C.2 shows the result for dissatisfaction about housing conditions. Column 1 shows the
within-block estimates by including block fixed effects. The only individual characteristics statisti-
cally significantly correlated with within-project variation in perceptions is household size. Income,
education, age or the country of origin of the household head are uncorrelated with perceptions
of the environment. We also compute the standard deviation in the perception of the quality of
housing between public housing projects and within public housing projects. The standard devia-
tion is almost twice as high across blocks (80.1 percent) than within blocks (43.5 percent), and this
difference is statistically significant. This low level of within block variation on perceptions adds
confidence that there is an objective foundation for tenants’ subjective reports.
We finally test the robustness of the previous results with respect to potential confounding
factors in Section 2 of the on-line appendix. We check how the inclusion of each control variable
separately alters the effect of diversity on the various outcomes, and test for an additional potential
confounding factor: the average duration of tenancy of households in the block. On average, the
various control variables do not significantly affect the estimated effect of diversity, suggesting little
bias from confounding factors in our context.
7 Conclusion
This paper exploits French public housing policy as a natural experiment to identify the causal
effect of diversity on the quality of local public goods related to well-being, living conditions and
housing quality. The French Housing Survey provides a unique micro level of analysis of social
interactions among adjacent neighbors within housing blocks. We provide a detailed analysis of the
channels through which diversity operates at the local level while the previous literature focused
so far on aggregate outcomes and channels. We use the exogenous allocation of households within
public housing with respect to ethnic characteristics in France to address the bias from endogenous
residential sorting that reduces the confidence in previous empirical findings on fractionalization.
We find that fractionalization has a negative impact on other-regarding preferences, leading to
higher neglect and vandalism in the housing commons. Fractionalization also undermines collective
action for the improvement of the quality of housing. But in our context, fractionalization has
no effect on public safety, diversity being associated with social anomie within the housing blocks
rather than violent confrontations among neighbors - helped as well by an increase in municipal
policing in municipalities of high diversity.
This natural experiment calls for future research on the specific role of national, local and
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informal institutions in mitigating or magnifying the effect of ethnic diversity on the provision of
public goods. France is a country with a republican tradition that resolutely refuses to reify ethnic
identification as a strategy to prevent the ethnification of everyday life. Yet we find a significant
negative effect of diversity on local public goods in its public housing sector, comparable to the
association found in the US localities where multiculturalist institutions regulate ethnic relations
(Putnam, 2007) and in cases where public institutions are weak (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005).
However, on issues of physical security in French public housing, the costs to ethnic diversity
disappear. This may be due to the emergence of informal institutions (such as in-group policing
as in Fearon and Laitin, 1996) or the supremacy of state-level institutions in which local diversity
plays no role in the supply of order. Our evidence points to a possible third explanation, viz. that
the social anomie resulting from diversity yields no contacts among neighbors rather than hostile
ones. In any event, the results raise a puzzle, to be addressed in future research, on the general
power of institutional arrangements in overcoming the negative implications of ethnic heterogeneity
on the provision of public goods.
Tables
Table 1: Regression of Diversity on Exogenous Building Characteristics
Dependent Variable: Neighborhood Diversity by Nationality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Share buildings w/ elevator -0.012 -0.027 -0.005
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016)
Share buildings w/ sewage 0.064 0.014 0.049
(0.071) (0.095) (0.101)
Median number of units 0.001 0.001* 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Median date of construction -0.019***
(0.004)
Intercept 0.232*** 0.149** 0.205*** 0.214** 0.258***
(0.005) (0.069) (0.005) (0.092) (0.097)
Adj. R2 0.444 0.438 0.442 0.445 0.465
N 2,155 2,492 2,450 2,137 2,137
p-value 0.487 0.371 0.118 0.219 0.731
Each column corresponds to a separate regression of neighborhood diversity on the block-level building
characteristics listed in the first column. Each regression includes municipality fixed effects. Standard
errors clustered at the municipality level are reported in parentheses. The last line reports p-values: in
columns 1 to 3, it corresponds to the significance test of each of the three fixed characteristic; in columns
4 and 5, it corresponds to the F-test of joint significance of the the three fixed characteristics. Significance
levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics for each outcome
Mean (Std Dev) [Range]
A. Degradation of the common areas due to vandalism
Damaging the premises 1.637 (0.778) [1 - 3]
Graffiti 0.257 (0.437) [0 - 1]
Garbage on the floor 0.188 (0.391) [0 - 1]
Broken windows 0.136 (0.343) [0 - 1]
Broken doors 0.127 (0.333) [0 - 1]
Broken light bulbs 0.094 (0.291) [0 - 1]
Broken mailboxes 0.154 (0.361) [0 - 1]
Vandalism on the elevator 0.085 (0.279) [0 - 1]
Noise in daytime 1.595 (0.748) [1 - 3]
Noise at night 1.374 (0.627) [1 - 3]
B. Poor quality of housing due to low maintenance
Low care of the common areas 1.593 (0.752) [1 - 3]
Poor condition of the façade 2.433 (0.962) [1 - 5]
Cold in the apartment 0.175 (0.380) [0 - 1]
Cold due to bad insulation 0.065 (0.246) [0 - 1]
Cold due to breakdown in heating equipment 0.045 (0.207) [0 - 1]
Cold due to poor equipment 0.059 (0.236) [0 - 1]
Poor quality of soundproofing 1.981 (0.823) [1 - 3]
Breakdown of the elevator 0.155 (0.362) [0 - 1]
Toilet malfunction 0.153 (0.360) [0 - 1]
C. Low Public Safety
Robberies 0.095 (0.293) [0 - 1]
Aggressions 0.081 (0.273) [0 - 1]
Burglary (or attempt) 0.041 (0.198) [0 - 1]
D. Dissatisfaction with housing conditions
2.502 (0.983) [1 - 5]
Depending on the outcome, we have between 4,310 and 5,189 observations
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Table 4: Municipal Police Officers and Diversity
Dep. Var.: Number of municipal police officers per 1,000 inhabitants (log)
(1) (2) (3)
Municipality diversity by nationality 0.559*** 1.368*** 0.700***
(0.110) (0.112) (0.145)
Number of inhabitants (log) -0.235*** -0.169***
(0.012) (0.012)
Intercept -0.882*** 1.027*** 0.557***
(0.021) (0.099) (0.099)
Adj. R2 0.008 0.113 0.265
N 3,239 3,239 3,239
Département F.E. No No Yes
Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001
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Table 5: Rationalization of the channels based on repairs
Repairs related to: Vandalism Housing Quality Public Safety
Work in the commons: Major works: Security Equipment:
staircase, doors, façade, heating, entry code,
lights, glass toilets locks
(1) (2) (3)
a. Relationship between diversity and type of repairs
Diversity 0.131** -0.192** 0.138***
(0.054) (0.070) (0.040)
Adj. R2 0.022 0.007 0.006
N 2,247 2,247 2,247
b. Correlation between reported degradation and corresponding repairs (%)
Vandalism
Damaging the premises 5.79***
Graffiti 16.94***
Garbage on the floor 14.35***
Broken windows 11.86***
Broken doors 13.74***
Broken light bulbs 12.24***
Broken mailboxes 13.10***
Vandalism on the elevator 13.54***
Poor Housing Quality
Poor condition of the façade -3.46***
Cold in the apartment 3.89***
Cold: bad insulation 1.29
Cold: equipment breakdown 4.70***
Cold: poor equipment 0.012
Breakdown of the elevator -0.001
Toilet malfunction 4.31***
Low Public Safety
Robberies 2.52***
Aggressions 4.15***
Burglary (or attempt) 2.35***
Part a. The dependent variables displayed in the first line are defined as follows. (1) Repairs related to vandalism:
those likely to be done in response to neglect or voluntary degradation: repairs of staircase, windows, doors and lights of
the commons. (2) Repairs related to poor housing quality: those taken care of by the public housing office: revamping
of the façade, interventions to improve, among other things, the heating system or insulation quality. (3) Repairs related
to low public safety: installation of security equipment in the building. These three composite outcomes are regressed
on block diversity, controlling for the number of dwellings in the building and its date of construction (in 6 categories).
Robust standard errors adjusted for block clustering are in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
Part b. The table presents the correlation between each outcome variable and the corresponding composite measure
of repairs, using the full HS sample. For instance, for broken windows, we report the correlation with repairs related to
vandalism, while for robberies we report the correlation with repairs related to low public safety.
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Appendix
A Descriptive Statistics
Table A.1: Fractionalization by nationality at birth for tenants in Public Housing blocks
1999 Census 2002 Housing Survey
Mean 0.28 0.25
Median 0.26 0.23
Std Dev 0.19 0.18
Minimum 0 0
Maximum 0.875 0.802
Reading: The average public housing tenant surveyed in
the 1999 Census lives in a block with 28% of diversity.
The average public housing tenant surveyed in the HS
lives in a block with 25% of diversity. The highest level
of diversity observed in a public housing block is .875 in
the Census and .802 in the HS.
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Table A.2: Sample Characteristics: public housing population (2002 HS)
Mean Std. Dev
Household characteristics
Annual income per member* 12,226 7,923.83
Household size* 2.55 1.47
Household head characteristics
Age 47.09 17.13
Nationality
Native French 0.82 0.38
Naturalized French 0.06 0.23
Maghrebian 0.07 0.26
Other African 0.01 0.12
Employment status
Employed 0.58 0.49
Unemployed 0.11 0.31
Inactive 0.31 0.46
Level of education
No diploma 0.28 0.45
Lower education 0.51 0.50
Baccalaureate 0.09 0.29
Higher education 0.12 0.32
Socio-economic category
Craftsman, Shopkeeper 0.01 0.12
Executive 0.04 0.19
Intermediate occupation 0.12 0.33
Employee 0.20 0.40
Blue-collar worker 0.31 0.46
Building characteristics
Number of units in the building 35.83 55.01
Date of construction of the building*
t ≤ 1948 0.06 0.23
1949 ≤ t < 1974 0.52 0.50
1975 ≤ t < 1981 0.15 0.36
1982 ≤ t < 1989 0.11 0.31
1990 ≤ t < 1998 0.12 0.32
1999 ≤ t 0.04 0.19
Block unemployment rate* 0.22 0.13
Statistics obtained from the 5,189 public housing observations in the
2002 Housing Survey. Variables marked with a star are used as controls
in our baseline specification.
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B Detailed Regression
Table B.1: Baseline Specification: Detailed Regression
Outcome: Dissatisfaction with housing conditions
Diversity 0.335*
(0.173)
Household selection variables:
Income (log) -0.050
(0.032)
Household size 0.116***
(0.012)
Date of construction of the building (ref: before 1948):
1949 ≤ t < 1974 0.039
(0.092)
1975 ≤ t < 1981 -0.086
(0.098)
1982 ≤ t < 1989 -0.105
(0.098)
1990 ≤ t < 1998 -0.443***
(0.109)
1999 ≤ t -0.657**
(0.269)
Neighborhood characteristics:
Block unempl. rate 1.175***
(0.226)
Socio-economic Yes
background (Tabard)
Intercept 2.279***
(0.345)
Adj. R2 0.139
Observations 4451
The coefficients correspond to the baseline specification, estimated for the
"Dissatisfaction with housing conditions" outcome. The regression controls for
municipality fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the block level
are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
C Robustness checks
Table C.1: Are results driven by some major ethnic groups disliking being around foreigners?
Dependent Variable: Dissatisfaction with housing condition
(1) (2)
Diversity 0.414** 0.369*
(0.187) (0.209)
1. Nationalities(ref: French at birth)
Naturalized French 0.005
(0.186)
DIVl * naturalized French -0.300
(0.491)
European 0.048
(0.232)
DIVl * European -0.036
(0.651)
Maghrebian -0.223
(0.229)
DIVl * Maghrebian 0.160
(0.499)
African -0.100
(0.368)
DIVl * African 0.531
(0.886)
Asian -0.102
(0.989)
DIVl * Asian -1.324
(1.650)
Other nationality 1.163
(1.510)
DIVl * Other nationality -3.386
(6.227)
2. Major groups in HLM: Native French and Maghrebians
Native French household -0.066
(0.067)
DIVl * Native French household -0.045
(0.203)
Maghrebian household 0.005
(0.304)
DIVl * Maghrebian household -0.200
(0.668)
Intercept 2.347*** 2.296***
(0.350) (0.349)
Adj. R2 0.140 0.139
N 4,451 4,451
Each column presents the results of the regression of the dissatisfaction with housing conditions variables on
different specifications. Each regression controls for the set of controls included in the baseline specification:
household selection variables (income and size), date of construction of the building, block socio-economic
characteristics (unemployment rate and Tabard index) and municipality fixed effects. Robust standard
errors adjusted for block clustering are in parentheses. For the sake of comparability, we remind that
the diversity coefficient in the baseline specification is 0.335, significant at the 10% level. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table C.2: Variation in Perception of Housing quality: Within and Between Public Housing Blocks
Dissatisfaction with Housing conditions
Within correlation Between correlation
(1) (2)
Characteristics of the household head:
Male 0.017 -0.014
(0.065) (0.031)
Age -0.003 -0.003**
(0.003) (0.001)
Diploma 0.008 -0.031***
(0.014) (0.007)
Household income (log) -0.077 -0.146***
(0.062) (0.030)
Unemployed 0.046 0.085*
(0.105) (0.050)
Inactive -0.082 -0.063
(0.101) (0.047)
Household size 0.092*** 0.107***
(0.025) (0.012)
Naturalized French -0.111 -0.022
(0.114) (0.062)
European -0.028 0.105
(0.177) (0.086)
Maghrebian -0.089 0.019
(0.135) (0.061)
Other African -0.066 0.187
(0.223) (0.143)
Asian -0.342 -0.183
(0.790) (0.365)
Other nationality -0.097 0.409
(1.197) (0.520)
Building size (log) 0.031 0.077***
(0.044) (0.010)
Intercept 3.002*** 3.618***
(0.605) (0.284)
Block Fixed Effect Yes No
Départements F.E. No Yes
Adj. R2 0.184 0.081
Observations 5,188 5,188
Robust standard errors adjusted for block clustering are in parentheses
***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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